After sixfold market value jump, Doral seeks 78% pay increase for CEO Yoni Hantis
The renewable energy company wants shareholders to approve a compensation package worth up to NIS 7.4 million annually after its stock surged nearly 400% since Hantis took over. Critics point to a broader sector rally that has lifted rival companies as well.
Doral’s market value has increased sixfold since Yoni Hantis took over as CEO, and the renewable energy company is now seeking to further upgrade his compensation package for the second time in seven months. The company will ask shareholders to approve a proposal that would raise Hantis’ maximum annual compensation from NIS 4.2 million, approved last January, to NIS 7.4 million - a 78% increase.
At the same time, Doral is seeking to increase the maximum annual compensation of Chairman Dori Davidovitz, one of the company’s two controlling shareholders, from NIS 3.3 million to NIS 6 million.
Hantis took office on May 30, 2025. In the year preceding his appointment, Doral’s stock rose 31%, compared with a 37% gain in the Tel Aviv-125 Index.
Since Hantis took office, however, Doral’s share price has surged 396%, while the Tel Aviv-125 Index has risen 53%. As a result, the company’s market capitalization has increased from NIS 2.6 billion to nearly NIS 16 billion.
Under the new proposal, Hantis’ monthly gross salary would rise to NIS 143,000, a 30% increase from the package approved in January, representing an annual cost of approximately NIS 2.3 million. In addition, he would be eligible for an annual bonus of up to 12 monthly salaries in the first year, totaling approximately NIS 1.7 million, gradually increasing to 18 monthly salaries, or approximately NIS 2.6 million, from the third year onward.
For comparison, the compensation package approved in January included a maximum annual bonus of nine salaries, totaling approximately NIS 990,000.
Doral is also seeking to grant Hantis 138,000 stock options and 21,500 restricted stock units (RSUs), with a combined value of NIS 6.2 million and an annual accounting cost of slightly more than NIS 1.2 million.
The exercise price of the options has been set at NIS 78.6 per share, approximately 11% above the current share price and about 15% above the price when the board approved the grant. This means the options are currently out of the money, and Hantis will only benefit from them if Doral’s share price rises further.
The new equity compensation package comes on top of the one approved in January, which included 344,000 options and 103,000 restricted shares worth NIS 7.6 million. Those options have an exercise price of NIS 28.44 per share and, following the sharp increase in Doral’s stock price, are now significantly in the money. If the share price remains at current levels, Hantis is expected to receive a substantial gain when the options begin vesting in December.
Doral said the updated compensation terms reflect the contribution of Hantis and Davidovitz to the company’s performance, citing “the significant increase in the company’s market value, the expansion of its activities, improved business performance, the complexity of its operations, the successful execution of its strategy, and investor confidence.”
The company’s operational performance has indeed improved during this period. Doral’s mature project pipeline grew from 4.6 gigawatts and 3.8 gigawatt-hours of storage when Hantis took office to 8 gigawatts and 5.6 gigawatt-hours of storage at the end of March. Revenue in the first quarter also increased 52% compared with the same period last year.
However, Doral’s explanation does not address the broader tailwinds benefiting the entire renewable energy sector. Since Hantis took office, the TA-Cleantech Index has climbed 124%, more than twice the gain of the Tel Aviv-125 Index. Shares of competitors Enlight Renewable Energy and Nofar Energy have also delivered returns of 302% and 130%, respectively, during the same period.
Another question mark concerns Doral’s claim that granting options and restricted stock units “strengthens the alignment of interests” between executives and shareholders by linking compensation to the company’s value creation. While this argument applies to options, whose value depends on future share-price appreciation, it is less applicable to restricted stock units, which are granted without an exercise price and retain value even without a further increase in the company’s share price.
