Opinion
Chinese drones solved an immediate need. Now Israel must build a local alternative
Roy Bargil, CEO of Veloryx, wonders to what extent can a country afford to base critical operational ISR capabilities on systems over whose components, software, and supply chains it does not have full control?
Reports that Chinese components were found in cameras installed on unmanned vessels operated by the British Royal Navy may initially sound like another isolated cybersecurity incident. But behind it lies a much broader question: to what extent can a country afford to base critical operational ISR capabilities on systems over whose components, software, and supply chains it does not have full control?
According to reports, cameras installed on K3 Scout vessels established a “heartbeat” connection with an IP address in China. The UK Ministry of Defense said there was no evidence that data had been leaked or systems compromised, but the connection was severed and an investigation was launched. This is not proof of espionage, nor is it a reason to assume that every Chinese component is inherently dangerous. Still, the very existence of an unknown communication channel in a sensitive defense system illustrates just how difficult it is to maintain full control over a product built from technologies and suppliers spread across multiple countries.
There are effectively two separate questions. The first is where the critical components come from and what supply chain stands behind them. The second, and perhaps more important in ISR systems, is who controls the system once it becomes part of an operational capability: who controls the software, communications, and data; who can update it; and how independent the operator remains in the event of a crisis or war.
The British case is particularly relevant to Israel. During the war, thousands of commercial drones entered IDF service, including systems manufactured by Chinese companies such as DJI and Autel. They arrived through formal procurement channels, civilian initiatives, and donations to military units. Many provided troops with readily available, high-quality and relatively inexpensive surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities at a time when operational demand was rising rapidly.
It is important to say this clearly: in many cases, this was a sound operational decision. During a war, a commander who urgently needs an aerial surveillance capability cannot wait months for a development program, procurement process, or new production line to be completed. Commercial drones addressed a genuine operational gap and, in some cases, helped save lives.
But what makes sense as an emergency solution does not necessarily make sense as a long-term policy. ISR drones are no longer supplementary equipment. They have become a basic part of operational capability at almost every fighting echelon. They allow forces to see beyond line of sight, detect threats, collect intelligence, map terrain, and provide a real-time operational battlefield picture.
In that sense, an ISR drone is not simply a small aircraft with a camera. It is a flying intelligence sensor connected to communications, command-and-control, and decision-making systems.
The central question, therefore, is not only technological independence, but operational sovereignty: the ability to continue operating, maintaining, modifying, and expanding critical capabilities even when supply chains are disrupted, a supplier stops supporting a product, inventories disappear, or the interests of foreign governments change.
The real test comes during wartime. It is not enough to ask whether Israel can purchase thousands of ISR drones today. The question is whether, when they are urgently needed, Israel will be able to obtain thousands more at short notice, repair them, modify their software, replace a component that has become problematic, and adapt the system to a new threat without depending on the decision of a foreign manufacturer or government.
This is one of the central challenges facing Israel’s drone industry. Israel has the technological expertise, operational experience, and companies capable of developing advanced ISR systems. The challenge is not simply to build a good drone. Israel already knows how to do that. The challenge is to build an industry capable of manufacturing thousands and tens of thousands of systems at competitive prices and at a pace that matches the realities of war.
Today, this creates a cycle that is difficult to break. Procurement authorities may prefer a foreign product that is already manufactured at scale, readily available, and relatively inexpensive. Israeli manufacturers, meanwhile, struggle to reach the same price point or justify significant production capacity without firm purchase commitments. Without stable demand, production remains limited and unit prices stay high. When prices remain high, procurement once again turns to foreign products.
This is precisely the equation the government can change. Not through a blanket ban on foreign procurement, and not by automatically favoring every Israeli-made product, but through a multi-year procurement strategy that defines the missions in which a particularly high level of Israeli control is required.
For systems that collect operational information, operate alongside troops, and connect to other defense systems, special importance should be placed on control over software, communications, encryption, and integration capabilities.
Commitments to procure meaningful quantities over several years would allow local manufacturers to invest in production lines, maintain inventory, build more resilient supply chains, and lower unit costs. At the same time, faster testing and deployment processes could enable systems that have already proven themselves to move from prototype to serial production at a pace that reflects operational needs. Israel’s defense establishment is aware of the issue and has already begun moving in this direction; that trend should be strengthened.
Israeli procurement also does not mean that every motor, chip, or camera must be manufactured in Israel. In a world of global supply chains, such a goal is not necessarily practical or economically viable.
What is required, however, is a trusted supply-chain policy: knowing where critical components originate, understanding dependencies on individual suppliers, maintaining the ability to replace components when necessary, and ensuring that control over system architecture, software, communications, encryption, and integration remains in Israeli hands.
Such a policy also has economic value. A significant domestic government customer allows an Israeli manufacturer to scale production, reduce costs, and build capabilities that can compete internationally. Growing demand for ISR capabilities following the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East presents Israel with an opportunity to turn technological expertise and operational experience into an industry that can also manufacture at scale.
The British case does not prove that every foreign system is dangerous, nor does it mean that every Israeli product is secure simply because it is Israeli. What it does demonstrate is that a solution adopted during an emergency should not become a source of strategic dependence.
Israel does not need to manufacture every component inside an ISR drone itself. But it does need to know what is inside its systems, retain control over the critical elements, and ensure that when it comes to the platforms collecting the intelligence on which its military operations depend, control remains in its own hands.
Roy Bargil is CEO of Veloryx, a company operating in the homeland security sector.
