Opinion
A hacked fridge is a warning for every connected business
"The systems that keep businesses running may be exposed through connections their security teams do not know exist," writes Dr. Guy Waizel, a Tech Evangelist and Senior Researcher at Cato Networks.
The recent attacks on supermarket refrigeration systems in Europe carry a warning for any business that depends on connected equipment. A compromised controller can spoil stock, interrupt production, orstop deliveries, depending on the operation it supports. For executives in retail, manufacturing, logistics, and commercial property, the question is practical. Who can reach the equipment that keeps the business running, and can that access be controlled when something goes wrong?
The risk reaches well beyond refrigeration. Disrupted warehouse software can leave goods stranded even when they are ready to ship, while a checkout failure can stop sales despite full shelves. Across retail, manufacturing, logistics, and commercial buildings, connected equipment and external service providers link cybersecurity directly to daily operations. Some access paths bypass corporate controls, and some essential equipment cannot simply be taken offline for an urgent security fix.
The warning is not new. In 2022, attackers compromised Danfoss AK-SM 800 refrigeration controllers at roughly 40 Israeli stores in Israel in 2022. In the recent European incidents, French authorities identified compromises involving remotely managed controllers and urged operators to remove public internet exposure.
The same dependence runs through the rest of a connected store. Checkout terminals, electronic shelf labels and building controls are linked to everyday trading: a register outage prevents sales, manipulated prices create disputes, and altered food labels could misstate expiry dates or allergen information.
Checkout disruption has already shown what is at stake. A supplier-related ransomware incident disabled Coop checkout systems in Sweden and forced hundreds of stores to close. Even cash payments cannot keep a store open if the registers needed to process them are down.
The first defense is to give every system and contractor only the access their work requires. A cooling technician should not be able to reach payment systems, and a camera should not communicate freely across the store's network. Least-privilege access and segmentation can contain a breach; more granular microsegmentation can tighten those boundaries where equipment compatibility permits.
Those boundaries must be reinforced by changing factory-default passwords and removing unnecessary internet exposure. British cybersecurity officials highlighted both weaknesses in their account of the refrigeration attacks. The less visible problem is how maintenance firms reach those devices after installation.
A maintenance company may install its own cellular router and SIM so technicians can service a refrigerator remotely. That connection can bypass the retailer's monitored corporate network entirely. A security team may have segmented the store's systems carefully and still have no record of this separate route into critical equipment. Cellular service itself is not the flaw; the flaw is access whose existence, users and isolation have never been verified.
An inventory that lists the refrigerator but omits its SIM, cellular gateway or remote-support account misses part of the system that needs protection. Retailers must know who can use each route, where it leads and what activity is recorded.
The same dependence on external systems extends into distribution centers, where inventory records, scanners, conveyors, loading schedules and refrigerated transport must work together to keep stores supplied.
In 2024, a ransomware incident at a software provider disrupted Morrisons’ warehouse systems for fresh food and produce. The food may still be in the warehouse, but that does not help stores if the systems needed to allocate and move it are unavailable.
Online customers can also lose access to ordering, deliveries and refunds. A supplier incident can disrupt the retailer even when its own systems have not been breached.
Recovery plans must cover stores, warehouses and online operations together: reduced-capacity distribution, priorities for scarce deliveries and ways to reconcile interrupted orders. With fresh food, delays quickly become waste.
Even when a retailer knows exactly which equipment is vulnerable, fixing it can create another operational risk. Unlike ordinary business software, refrigeration controllers and warehouse machinery often need vendor approval, compatibility testing, engineering support and a maintenance window before an update can be installed. Taking equipment offline may stop the very operation the update is meant to protect. Unsupported devices may need replacing, leaving businesses exposed while they arrange a safe fix.
This is where protection at the network layer matters. Centrally managed, cloud-delivered enforcement can apply intrusion-prevention controls across stores, warehouses and remote maintenance connections routed through the managed inspection service. Virtual patching can block attempts to exploit covered vulnerabilities as malicious traffic passes through the inspection point, protecting equipment while vendor updates or replacements are arranged. The device still needs a permanent fix, but the business need not remain defenseless while waiting for a safe maintenance window.
Combined with restricted contractor access and network segmentation, that protection reduces the opportunity for an intrusion to move between devices and locations without requiring an immediate shutdown of essential equipment.
AI could help attackers exploit familiar weaknesses faster and across more locations, giving businesses less time to respond. That makes tighter access controls and faster protection more urgent. Whether AI played a role in the refrigeration attacks remains unknown.
The practical priority is to identify connections and equipment outside ordinary IT oversight, then plan for failure as carefully as for prevention. Independent temperature alarms, recoverable configurations, tested checkout restoration and alternative ordering procedures can help determine whether an intrusion becomes a prolonged shutdown or a contained disruption. This work involves facilities, food safety, logistics, procurement and store management alongside security and IT.
As businesses connect more equipment and rely on remote maintenance, they need to understand each system’s dependencies, access paths, and potential impact on operations. Every critical system needs an owner, a protection plan, and a tested answer to a practical question: how will the business keep operating if this system goes down or its information can no longer be trusted?
Dr. Guy Waizel is a Tech Evangelist and Senior Researcher at Cato Networks.
